What is Israel’s endgame in the war with Gaza? For Israel, the endgame must be to dismantle Hamas completely—both its military and political structures—if it is to secure a stable and peaceful future, avoiding the dangers of allowing a hostile force to regroup and reemerge.
By Dr. Tim Orr
The question many are asking these days is: What is Israel’s endgame in the war with Gaza?
In his recent talk at Yale University, Ben Shapiro provides a compelling answer to this pressing issue. He draws insightful historical parallels between Israel's current conflict with Hamas and the outcomes of World War I and World War II. According to Shapiro, the lessons from these global conflicts offer a crucial blueprint for Israel’s strategy.
Shapiro emphasizes that lasting peace can only be achieved through a decisive military victory, not temporary ceasefires or partial resolutions. He argues that, much like the failure of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, which left Germany capable of rising again and fueling further conflict, any resolution that leaves Hamas intact would likely lead to future violence. In contrast, he points to the total defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II as examples of victories that ensured long-term peace.
For Israel, the endgame must be to dismantle Hamas completely—both its military and political structures—if it is to secure a stable and peaceful future, avoiding the dangers of allowing a hostile force to regroup and reemerge.
Israel’s ongoing conflict with Hamas has been marked by a cycle of violence in which hostilities periodically flare up, ceasefires are brokered, and Hamas is left standing—albeit weakened—only to rearm and reinitiate violence years later. Shapiro’s historical analogy to World War I’s incomplete victory is particularly apt here. He illustrated how the Treaty of Versailles while ending the fighting in 1919, failed to dismantle the underlying German militarism and bitterness that fueled the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime. Instead of achieving a decisive victory, the Allies imposed punitive economic measures on Germany without eliminating its capacity for future aggression, leaving room for an even greater threat in the 1930s.
For Israel, Shapiro warns that a similar incomplete victory over Hamas would only lead to further violence down the road. The ceasefires that have ended previous conflicts with Hamas—such as those following Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2014)—did not destroy Hamas’s military capabilities or political power. Like post-World War I Germany, Hamas was left to regroup, rearm, and reassert its influence over Gaza. The result has been a continual cycle of war with no long-term solution in sight.
Shapiro’s illustration of the Treaty of Versailles highlights the danger of any negotiated settlement that leaves Hamas intact. Just as the Treaty left Germany bitter and ready for revenge, an unresolved conflict with Hamas would leave the group emboldened, waiting for its next opportunity to strike at Israel. Shapiro stresses that Israel’s endgame must be a decisive military victory, one that not only defeats Hamas temporarily but permanently dismantles its military and political infrastructure.
In contrast to the failures of World War I, Shapiro pointed to World War II as an example of how decisive military victory can lead to lasting peace. After the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the Allied powers ensured that these regimes were not only defeated but completely dismantled. The total military defeat of these Axis powers led to the establishment of democratic governments and the delegitimization of fascist and imperialist ideologies. The result was a long-lasting peace, particularly in Europe, where Germany became a stable democracy and a key ally in the post-war international order.
Shapiro argues that Israel must follow the World War II model in its war against Hamas. Just as the Allies sought unconditional surrender from Germany and Japan, Israel must aim for the destruction of Hamas’s military capabilities. This means not just degrading Hamas’s rocket infrastructure or temporarily weakening its leadership but ensuring that the group is unable to govern or pose a threat to Israel in the future. Shapiro emphasized that Hamas’s ideology, like Nazism, must be delegitimized in the eyes of the people it claims to represent. Victory over Hamas is not just about military defeat—it’s about discrediting the group’s radical Islamist ideology that glorifies violence against Israel.
This comparison to World War II illustrates the difference between temporary and lasting peace. In Shapiro’s view, partial victories—such as those achieved in Israel’s previous conflicts with Hamas—leave the door open for future violence. A complete victory, on the other hand, would eliminate the threat and allow for the possibility of rebuilding Gaza under a new, non-violent governance structure.
Following his discussion of World War II, Shapiro invoked the Marshall Plan, the U.S.-led effort to rebuild Europe after the devastation of the war. The Marshall Plan was not just about repairing physical infrastructure; it was about stabilizing Europe economically and politically, ensuring that the conditions that led to the rise of fascism would not return. This plan laid the groundwork for the democratic and prosperous Europe that emerged in the post-war era.
Shapiro argued that Israel’s endgame in Gaza must similarly include a comprehensive plan for reconstruction after Hamas is defeated. Just as the Allies rebuilt Europe to prevent the resurgence of extremism, Israel and its allies must help rebuild Gaza to ensure that it does not become a breeding ground for future radicalization. This means:
Shapiro’s reference to the Marshall Plan highlights the need for a multi-faceted approach to achieving peace. Military victory alone will not bring lasting stability. Just as Europe needed both military and economic rebuilding after World War II, Gaza will need comprehensive reconstruction after Hamas’s defeat.
Another key historical illustration Shapiro used was British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement before World War II. Chamberlain believed that he could avoid a larger war by negotiating with Hitler and conceding to some of his demands. This policy culminated in the Munich Agreement of 1938, in which Britain and France allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland, a region of Czechoslovakia, in exchange for Hitler’s promise not to seek further territorial expansion. Of course, this concession only emboldened Hitler, leading to the full-scale invasion of Poland and the start of World War II.
Shapiro drew a direct comparison between Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler and the international pressure on Israel to negotiate with Hamas. He argued that just as Hitler was not satisfied with partial territorial gains, Hamas’s goals were not limited to controlling Gaza. The group’s charter explicitly calls for the destruction of Israel, and any concessions or ceasefires would only give Hamas time to regroup and strengthen its forces for future attacks.
Shapiro’s point was clear: appeasing Hamas through ceasefires or negotiated settlements is a recipe for disaster. Like Hitler, Hamas will not stop until it achieves its ultimate goal—the destruction of Israel. Therefore, Israel must avoid the temptation to agree to temporary ceasefires or concessions and instead pursue a strategy of total military victory. Anything less, Shapiro warned, would result in a repetition of Chamberlain’s folly.
Shapiro also extended his World War II analogy to Israel’s broader regional strategy, particularly regarding Iran and Hezbollah. Just as Nazi Germany represented a broader threat to European stability, Iran and its proxies—such as Hamas and Hezbollah—pose a regional threat to Israel and its Arab allies. Shapiro argued that a decisive victory over Hamas would send a clear message to Iran and Hezbollah: Israel will not tolerate existential threats.
This deterrence strategy is essential for Israel’s long-term security. By defeating Hamas decisively, Israel not only neutralizes an immediate threat but also strengthens its position against other Iranian-backed groups in the region. Shapiro emphasized that Israel’s growing alliances with Sunni Arab states formalized in the Abraham Accords could be a game-changer in the Middle East. These alliances are built on shared concerns about Iranian expansionism, and a decisive Israeli victory in Gaza could further solidify these partnerships.
Ben Shapiro’s use of historical illustrations from World Wars I and II provides a compelling framework for understanding Israel’s endgame in its conflict with Hamas. As Shapiro pointed out, incomplete victories, like the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, leave room for future conflicts. Conversely, total defeat, as seen in the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan after World War II, opens the door to long-lasting peace and stability.
For Israel, the path to peace lies in achieving a decisive military victory over Hamas, followed by a comprehensive plan for rebuilding Gaza and stabilizing the region. This victory must go beyond degrading Hamas’s military capabilities; it must dismantle the group’s political power and delegitimize its ideology. Only then can Israel hope to break the cycle of violence and secure a future of peace.
Just as the Marshall Plan rebuilt Europe after World War II, Israel and its allies must commit to rebuilding Gaza after Hamas is defeated, ensuring that it does not remain a breeding ground for extremism. And like Chamberlain’s failure to appease Hitler, Israel must avoid the trap of negotiating with an enemy whose ultimate goal is its destruction.
In the end, decisive victory is the only way forward for Israel. Anything less will lead to continued violence and instability, just as incomplete victories in the past have led to future wars. Israel’s endgame, as Shapiro so clearly articulated, must be not just survival but a reshaping of the region that ensures lasting peace for generations to come.
Shapiro, B. (2024, October 7). How October 7 broke America’s colleges [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6D1b6ymoFM
Tim Orr is a scholar, Evangelical minister, conference speaker, and interfaith consultant with over 30 years of experience in cross-cultural ministry. He holds six degrees, including a master’s in Islamic studies from the Islamic College in London. Tim taught Religious Studies for 15 years at Indiana University Columbus and is now a Congregations and Polarization Project research associate at the Center for the Study of Religion and American Culture at Indiana University Indianapolis. He has spoken at universities, including Oxford University, the University of Tehran, and mosques throughout the U.K. His research focuses on American Evangelicalism, Islamic antisemitism, and Islamic feminism, and he has published widely, including articles in Islamic peer-reviewed journals and three books.