Governance of the Jurist, sought to fuse religion and politics under the leadership of an Islamic scholar, creating what he believed would be the ideal Islamic society.
By Dr. Tim Orr
As an evangelical scholar with a background in Shia Islamic studies, I approach the analysis of Wilayat al-Faqih from a theological and comparative religious perspective. My studies in Shia Islam at the Islamic College in London, under the guidance of Twelver Shia scholars, have equipped me to understand the religious and political dynamics underpinning this system and how Ayatollah Khomeini's theory aimed to shape Iran's governance. From an evangelical Christian viewpoint, I am particularly interested in how Wilayat al-Faqih contrasts with biblical models of leadership and governance and why it has had such profound social and spiritual consequences for the Iranian people. The interaction between religion and politics, especially under the rule of a single religious authority, offers critical lessons for both Islamic and Christian thought. Examining these dynamics allows us to explore how governance rooted in religious doctrine interacts with human rights, justice, and the role of individuals in society.
In 1979, Khomeini came to power with the promise of creating an Islamic utopia—a society ruled by divine principles and led by the most devout and knowledgeable jurists. The enthusiasm driving the Iranian Revolution was deeply rooted in Khomeini's political theory, Wilayat al-Faqih, or the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. This system, which he formally articulated in his 1970 book, aimed to merge religion and politics under the leadership of an Islamic scholar, establishing what he envisioned as the perfect Islamic society. However, more than forty years later, the legacy of Wilayat al-Faqih is marked not by moral governance or prosperity but by widespread disillusionment, social decay, and a spiritual crisis. As Iran confronts the fallout from this theocratic system, it is evident that Khomeini’s vision was not the solution to the nation’s problems but rather the beginning of a tragic decline.
Khomeini’s Vision for Iran: The Wilayat al-Faqih
In his 1970 work, Khomeini laid out his revolutionary vision for Islamic governance. He proposed that religious leadership should extend beyond spiritual guidance to encompass full political authority. This was a significant departure from the traditional Shia stance, which historically favored political quietism, especially during the absence of the twelfth Imam (the Mahdi). Khomeini believed that without the jurist's governance, society would fall into corruption and stray from the true path of Islam. He contended that in the Mahdi's absence, an Islamic jurist should take charge of religious and political matters, ensuring that Muslim governance strictly adhered to Sharia law.
This book laid the foundation for Iran's political system, which took full shape following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. At the heart of this system is the Wilayat al-Faqih—the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which centralizes religious and political power in the hands of an Islamic jurist (faqih). Khomeini envisioned an Islamic state where a qualified jurist would ensure that governance adhered strictly to Sharia law, reflecting divine will over human reason. The argument for this concentration of power stems from Khomeini's belief that secular forms of government, whether democratic or autocratic, were inherently flawed because they lacked divine guidance. For Khomeini, only a jurist who fully understood Islamic law and could act with righteousness and justice could lead a nation by God's will. This system represented a direct challenge to secular or democratic forms of government, which Khomeini viewed as morally deficient. In his view, only an Islamic jurist who fully understood Sharia could properly guide society toward justice and righteousness (Arjomand, 1988).
The theory behind Wilayat al-Faqih rested on Khomeini's argument that human governments, being products of fallible human reason, were prone to corruption, injustice, and error. He believed only a government rooted in divine law could create a just society. This theocratic model places the Supreme Leader (Wali al-Faqih) at the apex of authority, allowing him to override any decisions that contradict Islamic principles. In this system, the Supreme Leader controls the military, judiciary, media, and foreign policy, making him the ultimate guardian of the state's religious and political integrity. Khomeini's system rejected the notion of popular sovereignty, claiming that only divine law could ensure true justice. While the Iranian constitution theoretically includes mechanisms for accountability—such as elections for the presidency and parliament—the power of the Wali al-Faqih often supersedes these democratic structures (Schirazi, 1997). In practice, the Supreme Leader has the final say on all major matters, regardless of the will of the electorate or the decisions of elected officials. This creates a system where power is concentrated in the hands of one individual, posing significant risks to justice, accountability, and the rights of the people.
Khomeini’s political theory argued that secular governments, based on human reason alone, were insufficient to create a morally just society. He believed that governance should reflect the divine will and that only Islamic jurists who understood Sharia law could ensure a nation's moral and legal integrity. This theocratic model places the Supreme Leader (Wali al-Faqih) at the apex of authority, allowing him to override any decisions that contradict Islamic principles. In this system, the Supreme Leader controls the military, judiciary, media, and foreign policy, making him the ultimate guardian of the state's religious and political integrity. Khomeini's system rejected the notion of popular sovereignty, claiming that only divine law could ensure true justice, as human governments are prone to corruption and error (Schirazi, 1997). However, the system has faced significant opposition within and outside Iran.
While Khomeini's vision appealed to many as a solution to the moral failings of secular governance, it quickly became apparent that concentrating political power in the hands of a single religious figure also carried significant risks. The system’s reliance on the Supreme Leader's ability to interpret divine will correctly—and justly—created an environment where dissenting views could be silenced under the guise of protecting the faith. Furthermore, while the structure was intended to prevent corruption and immorality, it often led to authoritarian practices. Critics have argued that the concentration of power in the Wali al-Faqih undermines the principles of Islamic justice it claims to uphold. In a system where the jurist is the final arbiter of right and wrong, the potential for abuse of power becomes significant (Moin, 1999). Khomeini’s theory represented a bold shift in Islamic political thought, rejecting secular or democratic systems favoring clerical rule. However, its implementation has sparked significant critiques from both Muslim and non-Muslim perspectives, questioning its theological legitimacy and practical consequences.
To ground this theoretical critique in historical reality, consider the aftermath of the 2009 Green Movement, when the Supreme Leader overruled mass protests and public demands for political reform. The protests emerged as a response to the perceived rigging of the presidential election. Yet, they were met with brutal suppression by the state under the authority of Wilayat al-Faqih (Chehabi, 2001). This illustrates the broader concern about how the system centralizes power in ways that stifle democratic expression and oppress the will of the people. Despite the significant turnout in these protests, the Guardian Council—tasked with ensuring that elections align with Islamic principles—upheld the election results, demonstrating the immense power that religious authorities hold over political processes.
Muslim scholars, both Sunni and Shia, have raised substantial critiques of Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih, particularly on theological and practical grounds. These critiques reflect deep concerns about the overreach of religious authority into political life and the departure from traditional Islamic governance models. Critics argue that Wilayat al-Faqih introduces an innovation (bid’ah) that lacks support in early Islamic texts. For many Sunni scholars, the idea that a single jurist should hold such sweeping authority is seen as a distortion of Islamic governance, historically separating religious guidance from political leadership. They claim that Khomeini’s system inappropriately merges these two roles, which traditionally involved distinct responsibilities and checks on power (Abdollahian, 2004).
For Sunni Muslims, Khomeini’s concept represents an innovation (bid’ah) that lacks roots in early Islamic thought. Sunni Islam traditionally separates the roles of religious scholars (ulama) and political rulers, with scholars offering moral and legal guidance but not governing directly. This separation was intended to safeguard against the consolidation of too much power in one individual or institution. Critics argue that this division of labor was designed to prevent the excessive concentration of power in one individual or group. By merging religious and political authority, Wilayat al-Faqih disrupts this balance, creating a system where unchecked power could lead to tyranny. Sunni critics argue that religious leadership should remain distinct from political authority to avoid this type of abuse (Halm, 2004).
This critique is particularly relevant considering how early Islamic governance was structured under the caliphate. The caliphs, though political leaders, relied on scholars and jurists for religious guidance, but they did not govern as religious authorities themselves. This allowed for a degree of consultation and pluralism within the governance system, as political decisions were made in consultation with religious scholars rather than dictated by a single religious leader. The fear among Sunni critics is that Wilayat al-Faqih upsets this balance, placing too much power in the hands of the Supreme Leader, who can unilaterally impose his interpretation of Sharia law.
Within Shia Islam, some scholars also view Wilayat al-Faqih as an overextension of the jurist's authority. Traditionally, Shia scholars adopted a more passive political stance during the occultation of the twelfth Imam (the Mahdi), awaiting his return to establish legitimate Islamic rule. Shia theology holds that only the Mahdi, who is considered infallible, has the divine right to govern the Muslim community. In their view, political authority during this period should be limited, as no jurist can claim the divinely ordained authority that belongs to the Mahdi. Khomeini’s assertion that a jurist could wield comprehensive authority during the Mahdi’s absence departs from this view, leading some to question its legitimacy. They argue that the faqih should only act as a moral guide, not as the state's ruler. This departure from traditional Shia political thought has sparked controversy even among some Shia scholars, who see it as an overreach of clerical power (Kadivar, 1998).
A key criticism is that Wilayat al-Faqih concentrates excessive political, religious, and military power on one individual—the Supreme Leader. In practice, the Supreme Leader's decisions are often immune from public or parliamentary oversight, creating a system where accountability is minimal. Critics contend that this concentration of power is at odds with Islamic principles of shura (consultation), which emphasize collective decision-making and governance by consensus. The principle of shura, rooted in the Quran and Hadith, was intended to prevent autocratic rule by ensuring that decisions are made through consultation with the community. They argue that this system undermines the role of the ummah (Muslim community) in holding leaders accountable. Without proper checks and balances, they believe that the Supreme Leader can easily abuse his power (Chehabi, 1991).
This concentration of power stands in contrast to the historical caliphate, where rulers were expected to consult with scholars and the community. In traditional Islamic governance, rulers were accountable to the people and could be removed if they acted unjustly. In contrast, the Wali al-Faqih has ultimate authority over all aspects of governance, making it difficult to challenge his rule. Critics argue that this model creates a dangerous precedent where religious leaders are insulated from criticism and can impose their will without considering the needs or desires of the people. The lack of accountability in Wilayat al-Faqih is seen as a significant departure from Islamic tradition (Esposito, 2005).
For example, consider how the Supreme Leader’s unchecked authority played a role in the political purges of the 1980s, where dissidents were systematically removed or silenced. The decisions made by the faqih during this period highlight how concentrated power can lead to unchecked repression, undermining the principles of justice and accountability that are central to Islamic governance. In such a system, dissent is political and religious, making it easier for the ruling elite to suppress opposition while maintaining religious purity.
Both Sunni and Shia critics contend that Wilayat al-Faqih marginalizes the role of the people in governance. While Iran has elections, ultimate authority lies with the Supreme Leader, diminishing the sovereignty of the electorate. The ability of the people to influence political decisions is limited, as the faqih can overrule any un-Islamic decision. Sunni scholars highlight that the Prophet Muhammad allowed consultation with the community, whereas Wilayat al-Faqih places disproportionate authority in the hands of a single jurist. They argue that this undermines the Islamic principle of shura and the right of the people to participate in governance (Sachedina, 1988).
This marginalization of the people’s role in political life is seen as a critical flaw in Khomeini’s system. Critics argue that the legitimacy of a government depends on its responsiveness to the will of the people, which is limited under Wilayat al-Faqih. By placing ultimate authority in the hands of the Supreme Leader, the system effectively excludes the broader Muslim community from meaningful participation in governance. This undermines the democratic aspirations of many Iranians, who desire a system that respects both Islamic values and the rights of the people (Arjomand, 2009).
Many Muslims argue that the suppression of civil liberties under Wilayat al-Faqih is antithetical to the principles of justice and freedom that Islam promotes. The inability of the people to hold their leaders accountable has led to widespread disillusionment within Iran, particularly among younger generations who see the system as oppressive rather than liberating. As more and more Iranians, especially the youth, express frustration with the theocratic system, the regime’s reliance on coercion and repression only further alienates the population, creating a vicious cycle of disillusionment and oppression.
Sunni scholars also worry that Wilayat al-Faqih exacerbates sectarian tensions. Rooted in Twelver Shia jurisprudence, it is viewed by some as an imposition of Shia political ideology, creating divisions within the broader Muslim community. Sunni-majority countries with significant Shia populations, such as Iraq and Lebanon, have seen increased sectarian tensions partly due to this ideological divide. The export of Wilayat al-Faqih into these regions has led to conflicts, as Sunni populations reject what they see as Shia political dominance (Nasr, 2006).
Some Sunni scholars argue that Wilayat al-Faqih disrupts the unity of the ummah by promoting a distinctly Shia model of governance. This has led to divisions within the Muslim world, as Sunni-majority nations resist the spread of this ideology. The fear is that Khomeini’s system could deepen sectarian divides and weaken the broader Islamic community’s ability to unify around shared values and goals. Sunni critics advocate for a more pluralistic approach to governance that respects the diversity of Islamic traditions and avoids concentrating power in a single jurist (Halm, 2004).
This sectarianism has real-world implications, not only for Iran’s relations with its neighbors but also for the broader global Muslim community. By exporting a political ideology that is deeply rooted in Shia theology, Iran has inadvertently fueled sectarian tensions across the Middle East as Sunni and Shia communities become increasingly polarized. The consequences of this have been devastating, as seen in conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where sectarian divisions have become a major driver of violence and instability.
From a Christian perspective, Wilayat al-Faqih raises profound theological and ethical concerns, particularly concerning the separation of religion and state, human rights, and religious freedom. Many Western Christians emphasize that the integration of religious authority into political governance can lead to oppression, especially for minority groups. This system challenges the Christian understanding of servant leadership and the separation between church and state, a fundamental principle in Christian political thought. The concentration of religious and political power in the hands of one individual is seen as contrary to biblical teachings about leadership and governance (Jenkins, 2007).
One of the most fundamental Christian critiques concerns the lack of separation between religion and political authority. Jesus’ teaching, “Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s” (Matthew 22:21), is often interpreted as a call for distinct roles for government and religion. Christians view this distinction as essential for ensuring political power does not corrupt religious authority and vice versa. Wilayat al-Faqih merges the two, placing ultimate authority in the hands of a religious jurist, which Christians argue can lead to authoritarianism. This merging of roles is seen as dangerous, as it allows for the abuse of religious and political power without accountability (Marshall, 2013).
The Christian tradition of separating church and state is rooted in the belief that political power should not interfere with religious life and that religious leaders should not wield coercive power over individuals. This is a key element of Christian political thought, particularly Protestant traditions emphasizing individual conscience and freedom. In contrast, Wilayat al-Faqih allows the Supreme Leader to influence all aspects of life, including personal and religious matters. For Christians, this concentration of authority is problematic because it violates the principle of religious freedom and the autonomy of individuals to choose their faith without coercion.
Christians believe that government and religion should function separately to prevent the kind of coercive power structures seen in theocratic systems like Wilayat al-Faqih. This separation is not meant to marginalize religion but to protect it from becoming a tool for political control. The Christian critique is that Wilayat al-Faqih undermines this principle, creating a political system that lacks the checks and balances needed to protect individual freedoms. By merging religious and political authority, the Iranian government has placed both spheres under the control of one man, which Christians argue is a recipe for tyranny (Wright, 2009).
Furthermore, from a biblical perspective, governance is meant to be characterized by servant leadership, as exemplified by Jesus Christ, who rejected political power in favor of humility and service. In contrast, Wilayat al-Faqih concentrates power in the hands of one leader who exerts significant control over every aspect of the state's affairs, contradicting the Christian model of leadership, which values accountability, mercy, and justice.
A central tenet of Christian theology is that all people are created in the image of God (Imago Dei) and therefore possess inherent dignity and worth. This belief underpins the Christian understanding of human rights and the need for governments to protect the freedoms and rights of all individuals, regardless of their religious or political affiliations. Under Wilayat al-Faqih, however, the rights of individuals—particularly those of religious minorities—are often suppressed in favor of maintaining the state’s Islamic identity.
Christians would argue that a just government must protect the rights and dignity of all its citizens, including those who do not adhere to the state’s dominant religion. The systematic repression of religious minorities, including Christians, Jews, and other non-Muslims, under Wilayat al-Faqih runs counter to the Christian belief in religious freedom and the dignity of every human being. The enforcement of Islamic law through state mechanisms often leads to the marginalization of those who do not conform to the state’s religious norms, which Christians see as a violation of the God-given rights of individuals.
Furthermore, the lack of freedom of conscience under Wilayat al-Faqih is deeply troubling from a Christian perspective. Forced compliance with religious laws and the suppression of dissent contrary to the Christian belief that faith must be a free and voluntary act, not something the state imposes. The gospel emphasizes that true faith comes from the heart, and coercion only creates external conformity without internal conviction. This is a fundamental divergence between the Christian understanding of faith and the coercive nature of theocratic governance.
Despite the lofty promises of justice and moral governance, Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih has proven to be a catastrophic failure for Iran. Rather than fostering a society grounded in Islamic values, the system has driven millions of Iranians away from Islam altogether, and over a million Iranians, says David Garrison in his book, Wind in the House of Islam. The regime’s rigid theocratic control has also alienated the younger generation, who increasingly associate religion with oppression and authoritarianism. Over a million Iranians have reportedly left the Islamic faith, reflecting the disillusionment bred by Khomeini’s experiment (Boroumand, 2015).
Socially, the country faces immense challenges, including rampant drug addiction, which has reached epidemic levels. Economically, Iran is burdened by corruption, mismanagement, and international isolation, leading to widespread poverty. The regime’s inability to address these pressing issues, coupled with its heavy-handed repression of dissent, has created a society in deep distress. Politically, the system has entrenched authoritarianism, with little room for genuine reform or opposition. The Guardian Jurist meant to serve as a moral leader, has become a symbol of repression, as the Supreme Leader’s unchecked power stifles freedom and justice (Chehabi, 2001).
Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih has not created the utopia it envisioned. Instead, it has exacerbated sectarian tensions, stifled intellectual and cultural freedom, and alienated large portions of the population. For many Iranians, this theocratic experiment represents not a path to moral clarity but a descent into political repression and social decay. Khomeini’s grand vision has given way to corruption, authoritarianism, and a deepening sense of despair among the Iranian people. What began as a revolutionary movement for justice has become a cautionary tale about the dangers of unchecked religious and political power (Moin, 1999).
In the end, Khomeini's revolution has failed to achieve its goals and has betrayed the aspirations of a generation seeking justice and prosperity. Instead of the moral renewal promised by the revolution, Iran now faces social and political stagnation, widespread disillusionment, and a deeply divided society. The tragedy of Wilayat al-Faqih lies in its inability to deliver on its promises, leaving Iran a nation searching for a new path forward, one that respects both Islamic principles and the rights of its people.
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The ideas in this article are mine, but AI assisted in writing it.
Tim Orr is an Evangelical minister, conference speaker, and interfaith consultant with over 30 years of experience in cross-cultural ministry. He holds six degrees, including a master’s in Islamic studies from the Islamic College in London. Tim taught Religious Studies for 15 years at Indiana University Columbus and is now a Congregations and Polarization Project research associate. He has spoken at universities, including Oxford, and mosques throughout the U.K. His research focuses on American Evangelicalism, Islamic antisemitism, and Islamic feminism, and he has published widely, including three books.
